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Abstract
Formulating a dynamic game model of a world exhaustible resource
market, this paper studies welfare implications of Stackelberg lead-
erships for an individual country and the world. We overcome the
problem of time-inconsistency by imposing a “credibility condition”
on the Markovian strategy of the Stackelberg leader. Under this con-
dition, we show that the presence of a global Stackelberg leader leaves
the follower worse off relative to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the
world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium as compared with the
two Stackelberg equilibria.
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1 Introduction
International trade in vital inputs such as oil and natural gas is a major
concern for resource-poor and resource-rich economies. Reflecting this fact,
World Trade Report of the WTO [31] that focuses on trade in natural re-
sources points out that “natural resources represent a significant and growing
share of world trade and amounted to some 24 per cent of total merchandise
trade in 2008” (p. 40). It is obvious that fluctuations in prices and quantities
of these resources can heavily affect the economic performance and welfare of
individual countries as well as the global economy.1 Considering the contem-
porary world market of natural resources, Karp and Newbery [10, p. 303]
drew attention to two salient characteristics. First, a small group of buyers
has a substantial share of the world demand, while a small group of sellers
control much of the world supply, allowing them to exercise market power.2
The world market for oil and gas is dominated by Russia and OPEC countries
as major suppliers, while the United States, Japan and China account for
much of the world imports. The second feature is that all natural resources
are potentially exhaustible and therefore a careful analysis should take into
account consideration of both flows and stocks.
This paper formulates a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible
resource, paying special attention to the welfare implications of leaderships.
There is a large theoretical literature on the exercise of market power in
the trading relationship between a resource-poor country and a resource-rich
country. Broadly, this literature consists of three groups of models. The first
group is characterized by the assumption that the resource-exporting country
exercises its market power while the importing country is passive.3 The
second one considers the opposite scenario: the importing country imposes
1Blanchard and Gali [5] empirically consider the macroeconomic effects of oil price
shocks.
2According to the 2008 data of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 67% of
oil exports come from the OPEC countries while the United States and Japan account for
33% and 14% shares of oil imports, respectively.
3See Kemp and Long [13] and a survey by Long [18].
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a tariff to shift resource rents away from passive foreign resource owners.4
The third one deals with the case of bilateral monopoly: both the importing
and exporting countries realize that they have market power and behave
strategically.5 This paper belongs to the third group, but we probe more
deeply into the issue of leadership.
In modeling leaderships in a dynamic game, three solution concepts have
been defined in the literature. The first is an open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium in which both the leader and follower use strategies that specify their
actions as functions of time alone.6 As shown by Kemp and Long [14], this so-
lution concept is vulnerable to the problem of time inconsistency: the leader
is tempted to deviate from the predetermined path strategy in later periods.
The second is called a global Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader an-
nounces a stock-dependent (i.e. Markovian) decision rule at the beginning
of the game and then the follower chooses a stock-dependent decision rule,
taking the leader’s rule as given. As is true of the open-loop solution, this
equilibrium is also generally time inconsistent.7 The third solution concept
is a stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium in which no precommitment of any
significant length is allowed for either player: the leader can only determines
the stock-dependent decision rule just prior to the follower’s choice in each
period.8 By definition, the solution is time consistent since no player pre-
commits. Rubio [24] and Rubio and Escriche [25] compute the stagewise
Stackelberg equilibrium in a set-up similar to ours, finding that the Stack-
elberg equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium when the exporting
4See Kemp and Long [14], Bergstrom [4], Brander and Djajic [6], Karp [9], Maskin and
Newbery [21], and Karp and Newbery [10,11,12].
5This group includes Karp [9], Wirl [29], Wirl and Dockner [30], Tahvonen [28], Rubio
and Escriche [25], Liski and Tahvonen [17], Rubio [24], and Chou and Long [7].
6To adopt the terminology of Reinganum and Stokey [23], open-loop strategies are
“path strategies,” which they distinguish from “decision rule strategies” or Markovian
strategies.
7Long and Sorger [20] discuss this issue. They point out that the global feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium is “generically not time-consistent.”
8The concepts of ‘global Stackelberg equilibrium’ and ‘stagewise Stackelberg equilib-
rium’ were discussed in Mehlmann [22] and Basar and Olsder [1]. For examples of these
equilibria, see Long [18].
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country is a leader.
In this paper, we consider global Stackelberg equilibria in a resource mar-
ket, and impose a time-consistency requirement which effectively restricts the
set of strategies that a leader can choose. We characterize a global Stack-
elberg equilibrium in linear strategies where the importing country leads,
and one where the exporting country leads. We compare the resulting wel-
fare levels with the Nash equilibrium welfare. In deriving these equilibria,
we propose a condition called “ credibility condition” that guarantees time
consistency of the global Stackelberg equilibrium.
Our reasons for paying special attention to the global Stackelberg equi-
librium are as follows. First, there is no compelling reason to prefer the
stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium to the global one if time inconsistency is
overcome. As mentioned above, we will show that the global Stackelberg
equilibrium can be time consistent by imposing a time consistency condi-
tion. Thus, it makes sense to consider some implications of the global so-
lution. Second, this solution concept has been successfully adopted in the
literature, mainly in the field of taxation, e.g., Kemp, Long and Shimomura
[15], Long and Shimomura [19], Benchekroun and Long [2], and Benchekroun
et al. [3].9 Therefore, it is of some interest to find out what one can infer
from the global solution, in contrast to the stagewise solution. Finally, it has
been argued that some degree of precommitment by the leader can be ob-
served. Among others, OPEC serves as a precommitment device to extract
oil rents.10 In this respect, the case of the leader’s precommitment is worth
addressing. We will demonstrate that the coincidence of the Nash equilib-
rium and the Stackelberg equilibrium under the exporter’s leadership is no
longer valid under the global solution. And, by using numerical examples,
we will establish that the world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium
and lowest under the leadership of the importing country.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model and the
9Chapter 5 in Dockner et al. [8] provides both a theory and economic applications of
the global Stackelberg equilibrium.
10See, for example, Kohl [16].
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feedback Nash equilibrium as a reference point. Sections 3 and 4 derive
the global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies in which either of the
importing and exporting countries is a leader. Based on the results, Section 5
seeks some interesting properties of the global Stackelberg equilibria. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 The Basic Model
This section presents our basic model and the feedback Nash equilibrium as
a benchmark for comparison with global Stackelberg equilibria.11 There are
two countries, a resource-importing country (Home) and a resource-exporting
country (Foreign). All the Foreign variables are distinguished from the Home
variables by attaching an asterisk (*). Foreign does not consume the resource
good.12 Home imposes a specific tariff on its imports. Foreign has a stock
of resource X. We assume that the extraction cost per unit increases as the
stock dwindles. This can be easily pictured by thinking of a cylinder-shaped
mine. The surface area of the mine is unity by normalization, so the depth
at which the last unit of resource can be found is X. The marginal cost of
extraction increases with the depth of the mine. Denote by q(t) the rate of
extraction and by S(t) the depth reached at time t, where : S˙(t) = q(t). We
assume that at any time, the cost of extracting q is cSq, i.e., the marginal
cost of extraction is cS.13 Thus, the deeper one has to go down, the higher
is the marginal cost.
Home’s inverse demand function of the resource good is
pc = a− q, a > c, (1)
where pc is the price which the consumers have to pay per unit. The pa-
rameter a is called the ‘choke price.’ It is the marginal utility of consuming
11For a detailed derivation of the Nash equilibrium reported below, see Chou and Long
[7].
12For a model where Foreign also consumes the resource good, see Brander and Djajic
[6].
13In what follows, we suppress the time argument t unless confusion arises.
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the first unit. Let S denote the depth at which the marginal extraction cost
equals the choke price, i.e., cS = a. We assume that X is larger than S.
Then, efficiency implies that the resource stock be abandoned as soon as the
depth S reaches its critical level S = a/c, i.e., before physical exhaustion of
the stock.14
Let τ be a per unit tariff levied on imported resources. Then, the con-
sumer price of Home is
pc = p+ τ. (2)
where p(t) is the price posted at time t by the exporting country which uses
a Markovian decision rule p = p(S).15 From (1) and (2), the Home demand
is given by q = a− p− τ , from which the resource dynamics is
S˙ = a− p(S)− τ, S(0) = S0 : given. (3)
Taking equation (3) as a constraint, Home chooses a time profile of tariffs
to maximize the discounted stream of the sum of consumer surplus and tariff
revenue:
max
τ
∫ ∞
0
e−rtWdt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[a− p(S) + τ ] [a− p(S)− τ ]
2
dt, (4)
where r > 0 is a constant rate of discount. Note that since this section deals
with the Nash equilibrium, in solving this problem, we assume that Home
takes Foreign’s decision rule p(S) as given. In a parallel way, Foreign chooses
a time profile of producer prices to maximize the discounted stream of profits:
max
p
∫ ∞
0
e−rtpidt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt (p− cS) [a− p− τ(S)] dt, (5)
where τ(S) is Home’s decision rule for its tariff rate.
14This formulation was used in Karp [9]. It has been extended to the case of oligopoly
by Salo and Tahvonen [26]. In a recent exposition of the state of the oil market, Smith [27,
p. 147] pointed out that “most of the oil in any given deposit will never be produced, and
therefore does not count as proved reserves, because it would be too costly to effect complete
recovery.” This indicates that the “exhaustion” of a deposit should be interpreted as an
“economic abandonment” of the deposit after the profitable part has been exploited.
15Note that at the moment p(S) is in principle any arbitrary decision rule: it maps the
state variable S(t) to the posted price p(t). Only after the equilibrium pair of decision
rules is found can one use the equilibrium function p(S) to predict the price.
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Since this is a typical linear-quadratic game, it is straightforward to char-
acterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. In particular, Chou and Long [7]
find the feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies:
τ(S) =
(
a
c
− S
)
µ2
4r
≡ αS + β
p(S) =
2c+ µ
6
S +
a(r + µ)µ
2rc
≡ α∗S + β
where µ is the positive root of the quadratic equation (3/4)µ2 + rµ− cr = 0,
i.e., µ = 2
[
(r2 + 3cr)1/2 − r
]
/3. And, the value function of Home V (S) is
quadratic in S such that
V (S) =
µ2
8r
S2 − aµ
2
4rc
S +
1
2r
(
aµ
2c
)2
,
for all S in the interval
[
0, a
c
]
. Finally, in the Nash equilibrium, the value
function of Foreign is V ∗(S) = 2V (S). Notice that the Nash equilibrium pair
decision rules (τ(S), p(S)) displays an attractive feature: as S approaches
the abandonment level S = a/c, (i) the tariff rate falls gradually to zero, and
(ii) the posted price p rises gradually to the choke price a.
Remark 1 The time path of the stock is
S(t) =
(
S0 − a
c
)
e−(α+α
∗)t +
a
c
with −(α + α∗) =
(
r −√D
)
/3 < 0 and D ≡ r2 + 3rc > 0. Then V (S(t)) is
obtained from substituting S(t) =
(
S0 − ac
)
e−(α+α
∗)t + a
c
into V (S).
The feedback Nash equilibrium gives a reference point in the comparison
with Stackelberg equilibria. In particular, it is useful to find the welfare level
of each country under S = 0:
V (0) =
1
2r
(
aµ
2c
)2
(6)
V ∗(0) =
1
r
(
aµ
2c
)2
. (7)
This completes the description of the Nash equilibrium. The subsequent
sections derive the global Stackelberg equilibria in this model.
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3 Global Stackelberg Equilibrium with the
Importer’s Leadership
To find the global Stackelberg equilibrium in which Home is a leader, we
suppose that it announces a linear tariff rule τ(S) = αS+β at the beginning
of the game. To determine the leader optimal pair (α, β) we must first solve
for the follower’s reaction function: how does the follower’s strategy depend
on any arbitrary pair (α, β). Thus, taking (α, β) as given, Foreign’s best
reply must satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rV ∗(S) = max
p
{(p− cS)(a− p− αS − β) + V ∗S (S)(a− p− αS − β)} ,
where V ∗(S) is Foreign’s value function and V ∗S (S) ≡ dV ∗(S)/dS. Inverting
the first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields Foreign’s
strategy:
p(S) =
−V ∗S (S) + (−α + c)S + a− β
2
.
where V ∗S (S) is to be determined. Given the linear-quadratic game, it is
plausible to guess that V ∗(S) is quadratic:
V ∗(S) =
A∗
2
S2 +B∗S + C∗ for S ∈
[
0, S
]
, (8)
where A∗, B∗ and C∗ are undetermined coefficients to be endogenously de-
rived. Eq. (8) immediately leads to V ∗S (S) = A
∗S + B∗ and the above
strategy is rewritten as
p =
(−A∗ − α + c)S −B∗ + a− β
2
. (9)
Substituting these results into (8), we have an identity in S:
r
(
A∗
2
S2 +B∗S + C∗
)
=
[
(A∗ − α− c)S +B∗ + a− β
2
]2
.
Equating the coefficients of S2 and S, and of the constant term on the left-
hand side with those on the right-hand side, we have
rA∗
2
=
(
A∗ − α− c
2
)2
8
rB∗ =
(A∗ − α− c)(B∗ + a− β)
2
rC∗ =
(
B∗ + a− β
2
)2
.
Solving the first equation for A∗ yields16
A∗ = α + c+ r ±
√
∆, ∆ ≡ r(2α + 2c+ r) > 0.
Substituting (9) into the resource dynamics leads to
S˙ = a− αS − β − (−A
∗ − α + c)S −B∗ + a− β
2
=
(A∗ − α− c)
2
S +
B∗ + a− β
2
.
Therefore, in order to guarantee asymptotic stability, we require that (A∗ − α− c) <
0. As a result, A∗ is determined as
A∗ = α + c+ r −
√
∆. (10)
Using (10), we obtain
B∗ =
(
r −√∆
)
(a− β)
r +
√
∆
=
(
−α− c− r +√∆
)
(a− β)
α + c
. (11)
Substituting (11) into the equation for C∗, we get
C∗ =
1
4r

(
−r +√∆
)
(a− β)
α + c
2 . (12)
Finally, substituting (10) and (11) into (9), the exporter’s strategy takes a
form
p(S) =
−2α− r +√∆
2
S +
(
2α + 2c+ r −√∆
)
(a− β)
2(α + c)
≡ α∗S + β∗ (13)
We see from this equation that α∗ depends on α and β∗ depends on both α
and β. In this sense, p(S) is the follower’s reaction function. Given τ(S), the
16Here, we assume that Home’s choice of α is such that 2α + 2c + r > 0. This will be
verified later.
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function p(S) is determined. The resulting price that consumers in Home
face can then be expressed as a function of the state variable S :
pc = pc(S) = p(S) + τ(S) = −
(
r −√∆
2
)
S +
[
a+
(
r −√∆
2
)(
a− β
α + c
)]
(14)
The function (14) has α and β as parameters. Now, as S approaches the
threshold level S = a/c where economic efficiency would call for abandon-
ment of the remaining stock X − S, intuitively in any sensible equilibrium
the consumer’s price should approach the choke price a. (If it did not, there
would be an incentive for the leader, Home, to deviate from its tariff strategy
when S is approaching S.) We formalize this idea by making the following
definition.
Definition 1 (credibility condition) An equilibrium consumer’s price
function pc(S) is said to satisfy the credibility condition if and only if
lim
S→S
pc(S) = a. (15)
Even though the above credibility condition has not been formalized in
the literature, earlier authors such as Kemp and Long (1980), Karp (1984),
and Karp and Newbery (1991a,b, 1992) have alluded to the desirability of
requiring that when the importing country stops importing, consumer’s price
should be equal to the choke price, because otherwise there would exist scope
for achieving gains to consumers (at a negligible loss of tariff revenue) by
adjusting the tariff rate near the end of the importing phase. The following
result immediately follows.
Lemma 1 When Home is the leader, the credibility condition (15) is satisfied
if and only if its choice of (α, β) satisfies the condition that
β = −αa
c
. (16)
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Having described the follower’s behavior, let us turn to the leader’s prob-
lem. To this end, substituting (13) into (3), the resource dynamics under
linear strategies is
S˙ = −(α + α∗)S + a− β − β∗,
the solution of which is
S(t) = e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − a− β − β
∗
α + α∗
)
+
a− β − β∗
α + α∗
.
The instantaneous welfare of Home under linear strategies τ(S) = αS+β
and p(S) = α∗S + β∗ is
2W =
(
α∗2 − α2
)
S2 − 2 [αβ + α∗ (a− β∗)]S +
(
a− β∗2
)2 − β2.
Substituting the above solution of S, and α∗ and β∗ in (13) into this felicity
function and rearranging terms, we obtain
2W =
r (3α + c+ r)− (2α + r)√∆
2
e(r−
√
∆)t
(
S0 − a− β
α + c
)2
+
(
r −√∆
)
(αa+ βc)
α + c
e
r−√∆
2
t
(
S0 − a− β
α + c
)
.
Taking the integral of this function, Home’s payoff from any state-date pair
(S ′, t′) is finally obtained as
∫ ∞
t′
e−r(t−t
′)Wdt =
r(3α + c+ r)− (2α + r)√∆
4
√
∆
(
S ′ − a− β
α + c
)2
+
(
r −√∆
)
(αa+ βc)(
r +
√
∆
)
(α + c)
(
S ′ − a− β
α + c
)
. (17)
At time t = 0 Home chooses α and β to maximize (17) with (S ′, t′) = (S0, 0).
Therefore, α and β are obtained by solving the first-order conditions by
differentiating the right-hand side of (17)- evaluated at (S ′, t′) = (S0, 0)- with
respect to α and β. However, the resulting solutions for α and β inevitably
depend on S0. This implies that if Home is allowed to reoptimize at any time
t1 > 0, the optimal value of α and β becomes a function of S(t1) which is
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generally different from α and β that depend on S0. In other words, α and
β determined at time 0 are no longer optimal at time t1, i.e., they are time
inconsistent.
One way to overcome this difficulty is to impose the restriction that αa+
βc = 0. This restriction will ensure that the derivative of the equilibrium
payoff function (17) with respect to the parameters of the tariff function be
independent of stock levels, for all non-negative stock levels. We will call
this condition a “time consistency” condition. The economic meaning of this
restriction is that when S ′ = S, Home’s payoff is zero, as the term inside the
square brackets in (17) is then zero. Interestingly, from Lemma 1, we can see
that this time consistency condition is satisfied if and only if the “credibility
condition” in Definition 1 is.
So, what is the relationship between the credibility condition and time
consistency? In our linear quadratic formulation, they turn out to be mathe-
matically equivalent conditions, even though they are formulated differently.
The credibility condition seems weaker, because it is only a condition on
the limiting behavior of the equilibrium consumer’s price function, and as
such, it relates only to values of stock levels near S. On the other hand,
the time-consistency condition is the requirement that the derivative of the
equilibrium payoff function (17) with respect to the parameters of the tariff
function be independent of stock levels, for all non-negative stock levels. We
conjecture that for non-linear-quadratic models, the latter requirement is a
stricter requirement than the credibility condition.
Under this restriction, the above maximization problem of Home amounts
to
max
α
r(3α + c+ r)− (2α + r)√∆
4
√
∆
(
S ′ − a
c
)2
.
The first-order condition is
r
1
2
[
3
2
(2α + 2c+ r) + 2c+
r
2
]
= 2(2α + 2c+ r)
3
2 .
While it is impossible to obtain an explicit solution of α for this equation, we
can prove the existence of the solution. Since we want ∆ ≡ r(2α+2c+r) > 0,
12
let us define λ ≡ 2α + 2c+ r and rewrite the above equation as
3r
1
2
4
λ+
r
1
2
2
(
2c+
r
2
)
= λ
3
2 .
Squaring both sides, we have
9r
16
λ2 +
3r
4
(
2c+
r
2
)
λ+
r
4
(
2c+
r
2
)2
= λ3.
Let us define
f(λ) = λ3 − 9r
16
λ2 − 3r
4
(
2c+
r
2
)
λ.
The rest of our task is to find λ > 0 that satisfies f(λ) = r
4
(
2c+ r
2
)2
. The
function f(λ) has the properties that f(0) = 0 and f ′(0) = −3r
4
(
2c+ r
2
)
< 0.
Noting that f(−∞) = −∞ and f(∞) = ∞, we conclude that f(λ) = 0 at
three values, λ1 = 0, λ2 < 0, and λ3 > 0, and that there exists a unique
positive λ∗ which satisfies f(λ∗) = r
4
(
2c+ r
2
)2
. This implies that there exists
a unique value of α which maximizes Home’s objective function. Finally, β
is derived as β = −αa/c.
This result is summarized as:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear
strategies where Home (the importing country) is a leader. As S approaches
S, the tariff rate τ approaches zero, and the price approaches the choke price
a.
Proof. The second sentence of Proposition 1 is proved as follows. Substituting
S = a/c and β = −αa/c into τ(S) = αS+β, we have τ
(
S
)
= αa/c−αa/c =
0. Substituting the same values of S and β into (13) yields
p
(
S
)
=
−2α− r +√∆
2
· a
c
+
2α + 2c+ r −√∆
2(α + c)
(
a+
αa
c
)
= a,
as is to be proved. ||
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Remark 2 Using αa+ βc = 0, we obtain from (17) the welfare of the Home
as the leader when the stock is S ′ :
V (S ′) =
r(3α + c+ r)− (2α + r)√∆
4
√
∆
(
S ′ − a
c
)2
The time path of the leader’s welfare is then
V (S(t)) =
r(3α + c+ r)− (2α + r)√∆
4
√
∆
(
S(t)− a
c
)2
with
S(t) =
(
S0 − a
c
)
e−(α+α
∗)t +
a
c
and −(α + α∗) =
(
r −√∆
)
/2 < 0.
4 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with the
Exporter’s Leadership
This section turns to the case in which Foreign is a leader. The detailed
steps for computing the equilibrium made as brief as possible because the
same derivation as that in the previous section applies to this case as well.
Supposing that Foreign chooses a feedback price rule p(S) = α∗S+β∗, Home’s
problem is
max
τ
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(a− α∗S − β∗ + τ)(a− α∗S − β∗ − τ)
2
dt
s.t. S˙ = a− α∗S − β∗ − τ.
The HJB equation associated with this problem is
rV (S) = max
τ
{
(a− α∗S − β∗ + τ)(a− α∗S − β∗ − τ)
2
+VS(S) (a− α∗S − β∗ − τ)} ,
where V (S) is Home’s value function and VS(S) ≡ dV (S)/dS. The first-order
condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields Home’s strategy
τ(S) = −VS(S) = −AS −B ≡ αS + β (18)
14
by assuming V (S) = AS2/2 + BS + C. Substituting this into the HJB
equation, we have an identity in S:
r
(
A
2
S2 +BS + C
)
=
[(A− α∗)S +B + a− β∗]2
2
.
Using the method of undetermined coefficients as in the last section, the
three parameters can be determined:
A =
2α∗ + r −√Γ
2
(19)
B =
−
(
2α∗ + r −√Γ
)
(a− β∗)
2α∗
(20)
C =
1
2r

(
−r +√Γ
)
(a− β∗)
2α∗
2 (21)
Γ ≡ r (4α∗ + r) > 0.
Substituting these into (18), the follower’s strategy is
τ(S) =
−2α∗ − r +√Γ
2
S +
(
2α∗ + r −√Γ
)
(a− β∗)
2α∗
≡ αS + β. (22)
We see from this equation that α depends on α∗ and β depends on both
α∗ and β∗. In this sense, τ(S) is the follower’s reaction function. Given p(S),
the function τ(S) is determined. The resulting price that consumers in Home
face can then be expressed as a function of the state variable S :
pc = pc(S) = p(S) + τ(S) =
(−r +√Γ
2
)
S +
[
a+
(
r −√Γ
2
)(
a− β∗
α∗
)]
(23)
The function (23) has α∗ and β∗ as parameters. Now, as S approaches the
threshold level S = a/c where economic efficiency would call for abandon-
ment of the remaining stock X − S, intuitively in any sensible equilibrium
the consumer’s price should approach the choke price a. So definition 1 in
the preceding section also applies here. We can now state:
15
Lemma 2 When Foreign is the leader, the credibility condition (15) is sat-
isfied if and only if its choice of (α∗, β∗) satisfies the condition that
a
c
=
a− β∗
α∗
. (24)
Invoking that the dynamics of S with the linear strategies is
S˙ = a− α∗S − β∗ + AS +B,
the solution is obtained as
S(t) = e(A−α
∗)t
(
S0 − a− β
∗ +B
α∗ − A
)
+
a− β∗ +B
α∗ − A
= e
r−√Γ
2
t
(
S0 − a− β
∗
α∗
)
+
a− β∗
α∗
.
Based on these preparations, we now consider the exporting firm’s prob-
lem. The instantaneous profit is
pi = (p− cS)(a− p− τ) = (α∗S + β∗ − cS)(a− α∗S − β∗ + AS +B).
Substituting A,B and the solution of S into this expression and making some
arrangements yield
pi =
(α∗ − c)
(
r −√Γ
)
2
e(r−
√
Γ)t
(
S0 − a− β
∗
α∗
)2
+
[aα∗ − c(a− β∗)]
(
r −√Γ
)
2α∗
e
r−√Γ
2
t
(
S0 − a− β
∗
α∗
)
.
Taking the integral at any (state, date) pair (S ′, t′) we have
∫ ∞
t′
e−r(t−t
′)pidt =
(α∗ − c)
(
−4α∗ − r +√Γ
)
8α∗ + 2r
(
S ′ − a− β
∗
α∗
)2
− [aα
∗ − c(a− β∗)]
(
2α∗ + r −√Γ
)
2α∗2
(
S ′ − a− β
∗
α∗
)
,
(25)
which Foreign seeks to maximize by choosing α∗ and β∗.
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Recalling the argument in the previous section, the optimal pair (α∗, β∗)
that is derived by partially differentiating (25) is vulnerable to time incon-
sistency; the pair determined at t = t1 deviates from the pair precommited
at t = 0. Following the previous section, let us make the time consistency
condition: aα∗−c(a−β∗) = 0 to ensure time consistency. Interestingly, from
Lemma 2, we can see that this time consistency condition is satisfied if and
only if the “credibility condition” in Definition 1 is.
Then, Foreign’s problem at hand reduces to
max
α∗
(α∗ − c)
(
−4α∗ − r +√Γ
)
8α∗ + 2r
(
S ′ − a
c
)2
.
The first-order condition is
(2α∗ + 2c+ r) [r(4α∗ + r)]
1
2 = (4α∗ + r)2,
which can not yield an explicit solution for α∗. However, we can prove the
unique existence of the solution by a transformation of variables.
Let us define γ = 4α∗ + r and square the above equation. Then, we have
r
(
γ
2
+ 2c+
r
2
)2
γ = γ4,
which is equivalent to a cubic equation of γ:
r
[
γ2 + (4c+ r)2 + 2(4c+ r)γ
]
= 4γ3.
We must find γ > 0 that satisfies this condition. Defining
g(γ) = 4γ3 − rγ2 − 2r(4c+ r)γ,
the rest of our task to find a positive γ which satisfies g(γ∗) = r(r + 4c)2.
Since g(0) = 0, g′(0) < 0, limγ→∞ g(γ) = ∞ and limγ→−∞ g(γ) = −∞,
we find three solutions to g(γ) = 0: γ = 0, γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0. Therefore, we
have arrived at:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear
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strategies where Foreign (the exporting country) is a leader. As S approaches
S, the tariff rate τ approaches zero, and the price approaches the choke price
a.
Proof. We prove the second sentence in Proposition 2. Substituting the
time consistency condition S = a/c and β∗ = (c− α∗) a/c into the leader’s
strategy leads to p
(
S
)
= α∗a/c + (c− α∗) a/c = a. Moreover, substituting
the same values of S and β∗ into (22), we have
τ
(
S
)
=
−2α∗ + r −√Γ
2
· a
c
+
2α∗ + r −√Γ
2α∗
[
a− (c− α
∗) a
c
]
=
2α∗ + r −√Γ
2
(
−a
c
+
a
c
)
= 0.
Thus, we have arrived at Proposition 2. ||
Before moving to the next section, a useful result is stated and proved.
Lemma 3 The undiscounted sum of imports over time equals S − S0.
Proof. Under the linear strategies τ(S) = αS + β and p(S) = α∗S + β∗, the
undiscounted sum of imports is∫ ∞
0
(a− p− τ)dt =
∫ ∞
0
[−(α + α∗)S + a− β − β∗]
= −(α + α∗)
∫ ∞
0
S(t)dt+ lim
t→∞(a− β − β
∗)t
= −(α + α∗)
∫ ∞
0
[
e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ S
]
dt+ lim
t→∞(a− β − β
∗)t
= −(α + α∗)
[−e−(α+α∗)t
α + α∗
(
S0 − S
)
+ St
]∞
0
+ lim
t→∞(a− β − β
∗)t
= −(α + α∗)S0 − S
α + α∗
= S − S0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of S: S = (a−β−β∗)/(α+
α∗). ||
Remark 3 Using the time consistency condition: aα∗ − c(a− β∗) = 0 , we
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obtain from (25) the welfare of Foreign as the leader when the stock is S ′ :
V ∗(S ′) =
(α∗ − c)
(
−4α∗ − r +√Γ
)
8α∗ + 2r
(
S ′ − a
c
)2
The time path of the exporting leader’s welfare is then
V ∗(S(t)) =
(α∗ − c)
(
−4α∗ − r +√Γ
)
8α∗ + 2r
[
S(t)− a
c
]2
with
S(t) =
(
S0 − a
c
)
e−(α+α
∗)t +
a
c
where −(α + α∗) =
(
r −√Γ
)
/2 < 0.
5 Numerical Results
Based on the results in the previous sections, this section seeks some implica-
tions of global Stackelberg equilibria for strategies and welfare in a compari-
son with the feedback Nash equilibrium. One difficulty is that the first-order
condition for the optimization problem of leaders involves a cubic polynomial
and hence we must resort to a numerical analysis. Tables 1 and 2 reports
the equilibrium strategies in the Nash and two Stackelberg equilibria, and
Tables 3 summarizes a welfare comparison.17
Notice that, in all cases, the total sum of imports over time (in quantity
terms, and undiscounted) is always S, which is just a confirmation of Lemma
3. So, policies only affect the time profile of imports and the time path of
the consumer price pc but not the total imported stock.
5.1 Comparison of α and α∗ (Table 1)
(Table 1 around here)
Table 1 tells us that α is negative while α∗ is positive in all cases. The
reason for this is as follows. If S increases, marginal cost and price rise, which
17We have checked robustness of the results in these tables for other sets of parameter
values.
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reduces the importing country’s welfare because both consumer surplus and
tariff revenue decrease. In order to deal with this welfare loss, the importing
country will lower a tariff for import expansion, i.e., α is negative. On the
other hand, a rise in marginal cost induced by an increase in S lowers the
exporting country’s profit. Hence, the exporting country will raise price for
securing its profit, which makes α∗ positive.
When the importing country leads, it is bound by the time-consistent
constraint β = −αa/c. It precommits to a faster rate of fall in tariff; α under
its leadership is more negative than that in the Nash case (the absolute value
of α increases). Observing this choice of the importer, the exporter optimally
responds by setting a lower price earlier on (when S is still small), i.e., α∗
becomes higher while β∗ becomes lower. The leader thus manages to tilt the
consumption path toward the present.
If, on the other hand, the exporting country is a leader, it is bound by the
time-consistent constraint α∗a = c(a − β∗). It chooses a lower α∗, and this
raises β∗. Thus, its posted price is higher earlier on. Such a choice induces
the follower (the importing country) to tax less and hence import demand
and profits that accrue to the exporting country become larger.
5.2 Comparison of β and β∗ (Table 2)
(Table 2 around here)
Table 2 is concerned with the time-invariant term of feedback strategies.
A first glance at them allows us to find that each country behaves more
aggressively when it is a leader, i.e., the importing (resp. exporting) country
chooses a higher tariff (resp. price) under its leadership. This is a natural
consequence since each party aims for more resource rents by using a higher
tariff or a higher price. As a result, the follower also takes a more aggressive
response to the leader’s precommitment. That is, β and β∗ of the leader are
larger than those in the Nash case.
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5.3 Welfare Comparison (Table 3)
(Table 3 around here)
We now compare welfare levels of each individual country and the world.
From the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is trivial that the leader
improves its payoff relative to the feedback Nash equilibrium. On the other
hand, the follower loses regardless of whether it is an exporting country or an
importing country. The follower’s welfare loss is large enough to dominate
the leader’s welfare gain, leading to a net welfare loss for the world. In other
words, the presence of leadership leaves the world worse off than the Nash
equilibrium. This result has a strong policy implication. As mentioned in
the introduction, there is some evidence that supports the hypothesis that
OPEC serves as a commitment device. Given this evidence and our result,
such an oil cartel should be eliminated from the point of view of the world
welfare. The same is true of the importing country. Although we have no
empirics at hand that shows the precommitment behavior of the importing
countries, such a behavior is harmful from the viewpoint of world welfare.
For this purpose, some kind of international organization or agreement that
can play such a role may be called for.18
5.4 Comparison between Global and Stagewise Solu-
tions (Table 4)
(Table 4 around here)
While we have focused on the global Stackelberg equilibrium in which the
leader precommits, it is interesting to compare our result with that under the
stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium. We omit the derivation of the stagewise
Stackelberg equilibrium since it is in detail provided by Rubio and Escriche
[25]. Here, we just offer numerical values of welfare by choosing the same
18One may claim that the WTO can serve as an international organization for elimi-
nating precommitment to trade-distorting actions. At present, 11 members of 12 OPEC
participating countries belong to the WTO.
21
parameters as Table 3. One notable insight of the stagewise Stackelberg
equilibrium is that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria coincide when the
exporting country leads.
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, and paying special attention to the case in
which Home is a leader, it gains more in the global solution than in the
stagewise solution, starting from the Nash payoff. The reason is that the
leader can attain a higher payoff by precommiting to its rule of strategies α
and β.
5.5 Time Path of S, τ(S) and p(S)
(Figure 1 around here)
It is useful to compare, across different scenarios, the time paths of S, τ(S)
and p(S). Under linear feedback strategies τ(S) = αS + β and p(S) =
α∗S + β∗, the law of motion of S is S˙ = −(α+α∗)S + a− β− β∗, and hence
we have
S(t) = e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ S, S ≡ a
c
.
Therefore, the time path of τ(S) is
τ(S) = αS + β
= α
[
e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ S
]
+ β
= αe−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ αS + β
= αe−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
,
where the last equality follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that assert that the
tariff becomes zero in the steady state, i.e., αS + β = 0. In a similar way,
the path of p(S) becomes
p(S) = α∗S + β∗
= α∗
[
e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ S
]
+ β∗
= α∗e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ α∗S + β∗
= α∗e−(α+α
∗)t
(
S0 − S
)
+ a,
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where the last equality uses α∗S + β∗ = a in Propositions 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the time path of S, τ(S) and p(S) under the three scenarios
with parameter values r = 0.05, c = 1 and S0 = 0. We briefly comment on
this figure.
The middle panel of Figure 1 shows the time path of the tariff rate τ
under the three scenarios. Not surprisingly, when Home is the leader, the
tariff rate is higher than that under the Nash equilibrium. With such high
tariff rate, Home is able to pay less to Foreign per unit, as shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 1. Conversely, when Foreign is the leader, it is able
to charge a higher price than under the Nash equilibrium. This is shown
as the dotted curve in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Consequently, Home,
being a follower in this scenario, responds by imposing a lower tariff rate to
ensure that consumers surplus is not too low. This is shown as the dotted
path in the middle panel.
The quantity purchased is the slope of the time path of S. This slope is
decreasing with time, as imports fall over time. Under Home’s leadership,
consumers buy relatively less (compared to Nash equilibrium imports) earlier
on, and buy relatively more later on. This is reflected in the slope of the
dotted curve for S in the top panel being less steep than the slope of the
solid curve for S. Under Foreign leadership, such tilting (relative to the path
under Nash equilibrium) is less sharp. While the long-run cumulative import
is the same (it is equal to S−S0 in all cases), the short-run cumulative import
(St − S0) is lowest under Home’s leadership.
5.6 Time Path of V (S), V ∗(S) and V (S) + V ∗(S)
(Figure 2 around here)
The top panel 1 of Figure 2 depicts the time path of welfare for Home
under each of the three scenarios. What is worth noting is that being a global
Stackelberg leader improves welfare substantially: the corresponding welfare
path lies above the other two paths. A similar remarks applies to the middle
panel which refers to Foreign. In the bottom panel, world welfare is depicted.
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Generally, the paths of welfare intersect. This is not surprising because at
the time when the intersection occurs, the stock levels are not the same.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a dynamic Stackelberg game model of a world market of
an exhaustible resource to consider some welfare implications of leaderships.
After characterizing the two global Stackelberg equilibria in which either of
the importing and exporting countries leads, we have shown that the world
welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium, namely, the presence of leaderships
imparts a welfare loss to the world. This, in turn, implies that some kind of
world organization or forum may be necessary to prevent the precommitment
behavior of either party from the world welfare viewpoint.
While this paper offers some novel results, our model should admittedly
be extended to relax a number of simplifying assumptions, e.g., linear de-
mand, and a price-setting firm. It is part of our future research agenda to
closely look at how our results are sensitive to the underlying assumptions.
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α α∗
Nash −0.257663891 0.371168053
Stackelberg (Home is leader) −0.8 0.849999983
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) −0.085096394 0.150325373
Table 1: α and α∗ under S0 = 0, r = 0.05, c = 1
β β∗
Nash 0.257663891a 0.628831943a
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.8a 0.15a
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.085096394a 0.849674627a
Table 2: β and β∗ under S0 = 0, r = 0.05, c = 1
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Home Foreign Total
Nash 0.128831946a2 0.257663892a2 0.386495838a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.275a2 0.05a2 0.325a2
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.042548195a2 0.307126431a2 0.349674626a2
Table 3: Payoffs under S0 = 0, r = 0.05 and c = 1
Home Foreign Total
Nash & Foreign is leader 0.128831946a2 0.257663892a2 0.386495838a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.222493132a2 0.148328754a2 0.370821885a2
Table 4: Payoffs under S0 = 0, r = 0.05 and c = 1: Stagewise Stackelberg
Equilibriua
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Figure 1: Time Paths of S, τ(S) and p(S)
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Figure 2: Time Paths of Welfare
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